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JURISDIC I IONAL STATEMENT 
\ : iovided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter 
resulting in this appeal pursuant u^ TTun rode Ann §78-2a-3(3)(j). These issues were 
addressed in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NUMBER 1. : Did the district courl UT in determining that an 
involuntarily dissolved entity may not biiiii' an action U> tiiallenyc an in «. iilul tax salt. " 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Willi regard to Issue Number 1, the standard for review is that the appellate court 
would give no deference i< •.; . -. : ai id rev iews ai ly si id: i 
correctness. See, State v. l'ooelc Count), 44 1\ 3d 680 (2002). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE 
DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1961) (repealed 1992) 
I he dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certmcan 
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or 
(2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and 
business of the corporation as provided in this act. or (') by expiration of its 
period of duration, shall tlot take away or impair any remedy available to or 
against the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right 
or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action 
or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date 
of such dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the 
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corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its 
corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power 
to take such corporate or other action as shall be appropriate to protect such 
remedy, right or claim. If such corporation was dissolved by the expiration 
of its period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of 
incorporation at any time during such period of two years so as to extend its 
period of duration. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-101 (1961) (repealed 1992) 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance 
of a certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code, or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its 
period of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation shall 
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to 
any property and assets which have not been distributed or otherwise 
disposed of prior to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue 
and be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and necessary 
powers. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1405(2): 
Dissolution of a corporation does not: ...(e) prevent commencement of a 
proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351(2) 
(2) Notice of the tax sale shall be provided as follows: 
(a) sent by certified and first class mail to the last-known recorded owner, the occupant of 
any improved property, and all other interests of record, as of the preceding March 15, at 
their last-known address; and 
(b) published four times in a newspaper published and having general circulation in the 
county, once in each of four successive weeks immediately preceding the date of sale; or 
(c) if no newspaper is published in the county, posted in five public places in the county, 
as determined by the auditor, at least 25 but no more than 30 days prior to the date of 
sale. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1353 
In all cases where any county claims a lien on real estate for delinquent 
general taxes which have not been paid for a period of four years, the 
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county may foreclose the lien by an action in the district court of the county 
in which the real estate is located. In this action all persons owning, 
having, or claiming an interest in or lien upon the real estate or any part of 
the real estate may be joined as defendants, and the complaint shall contain 
a description of the property, together with the amount claimed to be due on 
the property, including interest, penalties, and administrative costs. If the 
name of the owner of any real estate cannot be ascertained from the records 
of the county, the complaint shall state that the owner is unknown to the 
plaintiff. It is sufficient to allege in the complaint that a general tax has 
been duly levied upon the described real estate, without stating any of the 
proceedings or steps leading up to the levy of the tax. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Diamoi id / . , 
real property dated May 20, 1972 and recorded with the Weber County Recorder's 
Office. The record owner of the real property was Diamond T. Grazing Association Inc. 
Diamond i 11 razing Associatu .i.. i.i, :-...w-;.n\ . i- '• v* 
due and o • • - ^ i994 tiuuugu i^98. 
Subsequent thereto the Weber Count} Auditoi s Office caused a tax sale notice lo 
be served and published. The required notice of the tax sale was not piv, ,c>, u -
• ' . U s 
purchased a tax deed of the subject real property at the tax sale. 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc. sought to quiet title to the property for lack of 
proper notice of tl: le tax sale ii i tl ic It ial cc: i u 1: 1 1 ite t:t: ial cc: I n t foi u id tl lat tl le ecu u lty's 
iovide the required notice was an error but was noil-prejudicial to Diamond I. 
Developments, Inc. and furthermore that Diamond T. Development IIK IoiiM «>t bring 
this action. Diamond T. Developments, Itic, believes tr.^ ,IK ^ecoiui i c ;^: K ; i »urt was 
in c i ' i t H . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Diamond T. Developments, Inc. was the record holder of a contractual 
interest in real property dated May 20, 1972. R. 36, ^ f 1. 
2. The record owner of the real property was Diamond T. Grazing 
Association, Inc. R. 37 ^ 4. 
3. Diamond T Developments, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the State of 
Utah on or about March 31, 1979. R. 13 H 3. 
4. Diamond T. Grazing Association, Inc. inadvertently failed to pay the real 
property taxes due and owing on the property for the years 1994 through 1998. R. 37 f^ 4. 
5. Subsequent thereto the Weber County Auditor's Office caused a tax sale 
notice to be served and published. R. 37 Tf 4. 
6. Diamond T. Development, Inc. still owned the contractual right of record. 
No document recording the termination of Diamond T. Developments, Inc.'s contract 
was recorded prior to Weber County's June 1999 tax sale. R. 115^2. 
7. Weber County was fully aware of the contract right of Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. by virtue of a title report order that it received from Mountain View 
Title Company dated April 19, 1999 in which the contractual right of Diamond T. 
Development, Inc. was clearly set forth under the heading "Recorded Lien Holders." R. 
115 Tf 3. 
8. The required notice of the tax sale was not provided to Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. R. 37. 
9. David R. Brown, Chris Loock, and Chad Stokes purchased a tax deed of the 
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subject real property at the tax sale which occurred on June 9, 1999 for the amount of 
$7,1UU.UU l -• faxes of $1,300 55 R 37, % 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah Code Annotated §59-2-1351(2), Weber County was under a duty to 
ascertain the last ki low i i address of Diai i 101 id 1 Developr i iei it s ai id sei id notice of the 
pending tax sale. For whatever reason, the county elected not to even attempt to provide 
notice to Diamond T. Developments. Despite the fact that the County improperly held 
the sale • he county's failure to provide notice was non-prejudicial 
to Diamond T. Developments and furthermore that Diamond T. Developments could not 
bring this action against Defendants. 
The trial courts holding should be reversed because: 1) under Utah Code 
Annotated § 59-2-1351(2) the county is to send notice of to the tax sale to al] interests of 
record and the county nor the trial court is authorized to inquire into the nature of the 
recorded interest; 2) contracts of a corporation made prior to its dissolution survive 
dissolution; 3) at the very least the trial court she -ave found li ic.it.. 1 3ian 101 id T. 
Developments, Inc. contractual rights had transferred to its principals and allowed the 
principals to enforce those rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WEBER COUNTY FAILED TO NOTIFY DIAMOND T. 
DEVELOPMENTS, INC. OF ITS JUNE 1999 TAX SALE. 
The issue as to whom the county should provide notice of any tax sale is addressed 
in Utah Code Annotated §59-2-1351(2): 
(1) Notice of the tax sale shall be provided as follows: 
(a) sent by certified and first class mail to the last known recorded 
owner, the occupant of any improved property, and all other interests 
of record, as of the preceding March 155 at their last-known 
address (emphasis added) 
In this situation, Weber County made no attempt to send notice of the tax sale to 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc. by certified and first class mail. 
Despite Weber County's failure to send notice of the tax sale to Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. the trial court found that the county's failure was non-prejudicial 
because Diamond T. Developments, Inc. had not and could not perform under its contract 
and even if it had performed it was not entitled to a remedy under prior Utah Coae 
Annotated § 16-10-100 and § 16-10-101. 
The trial court's findings are in error for several reasons. First, The Utah 
Legislature, in Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-1351(2), did not authorize the county nor the 
trial court to inquire into the nature of the recorded interest but required the county to 
send notice of to the tax sale to aU interests of record. Second, the right that Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. is seeking to enforce is a contractual right and generally contracts of 
a corporation made prior to its dissolution survive. Finally, even if Diamond T. 
Developments was found to not have enforceable contractual rights or standing to bring a 
claim then the trial court should have found that the contractual rights of Diamond T. 
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Developments as a dissolved corporation had transferred to its principals and allowed the 
principals to have been * the action to ei lfoi ce 1:1 i.e coi lti acl ual i igl its. 
Because of due process, Utah courts have stated that the burden of proving that a 
valid tax sale was accomplished is upon the purchasers under the tax sale. See, Peterson 
v. Johnson, 34 P M f>w / (1 ii;ili [*) \4 ) In Asper v. Moon, 0 ; • ; -<•. . he court 
stated that the parties setting up title by tax deed must show that all the requirem^ H -
the law have been complied with. The Peterson court further stated, "[the court follows] 
the doctrine that one whose title is founded upon a tax deed must prove a strict 
compliance with the various provisions oi the statute i egi ilat.ii ig tl ic levy of taxes and the 
sale of the property upon which the tax has become delinquent when such tax title is 
asserted against the original owner or one claiming under him." See, Peterson at 699. In 
Bean v. Fairbanks, 151 P. 338 (Utah 1915), the court stated, "when one relies on a tax 
title, he must show in his pleading that each step, required by law to be taken to subject 
the property to taxation and to constitute a valid sale of it for taxes, has complied with." 
Id. at 517. 
It is clear that an invalid tax sale occurred and that it is ineffective as to the rights 
of the parties related thereto. 
II. W E B E R COUNTY WAS N O T AUTHORIZED TO INQUIRE INTO THE 
NATURE OF THE RECORDED INTEREST ACCORDING TO IJTAH r o r i F 
ANNOTATED § 59-2-1351(2) 
In Utah Code Annotated §59-2-1351(2), the Legislature requires that all notices of 
a tax sale be sent to all interests of record. Thus, Weber County was under a duty to 
ascertain the last known address of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. and send notice of 
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the pending tax sale. For whatever reason, the county elected not to even attempt to 
provide notice to Diamond T. Developments. 
The records of the Utah Department of Commerce showed an address of Diamond 
T. Developments which should have been used by the county. In addition, the county 
had another remedy available to it for foreclosing on its tax lien. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-
1353 provides as follows: 
In all cases where any county claims a lien on real estate for delinquent 
general taxes which have not been paid for a period of four years, the 
county may foreclose the lien by an action in the district court of the county 
in which the real estate is located. In this action all persons owning, 
having, or claiming an interest in or lien upon the real estate or any part of 
the real estate may be joined as defendants, and the complaint shall contain 
a description of the property, together with the amount claimed to be due on 
the property, including interest, penalties, and administrative costs. If the 
name of the owner of any real estate cannot be ascertained from the records 
of the county, the complaint shall state that the owner is unknown to the 
plaintiff. It is sufficient to allege in the complaint that a general tax has 
been duly levied upon the described real estate, without stating any of the 
proceedings or steps leading up to the levy of the tax. 
In other words, where there are questions having to do with the ownership and recorded 
interests in a property which is up for tax sale, the county has the option available to 
proceed in the district court to foreclose its lien. However, this was not how Weber 
County chose to proceed and thus the County deprived Diamond T. Developments and/or 
its principals of their due process rights to their property without fair notice. 
The trial court below found that the tax sale notice should have been delivered to 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc., but that it was not provided. This conduct of the 
County should not be condoned by the court based upon the dissolution statutes. The 
dissolution statutes clearly allow for winding up to continue even after the two year 
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period. Therefore, the statute is not fatal to Plaintiffs claim herein because the 
contractual right continued to exist even after the dissolution occurred. The contractual 
right of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. should be honored by the court. 
III. CONTRACTS OF A CORPORATION MADE PRIOR TO ITS 
DISSOLUTION GENERALLY SURVIVE. 
The general rule is that contracts of a corporation made prior to its dissolution 
survive unless the circumstances are such that the contract must be terminated on 
dissolution. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 951. See also, 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 2888 
p. 668; see also Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7115, pp. 206-07 (rev'd ed.1990); 
Solomon v. Greenblatt 812 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. App. - Dallas, 1991), Thrasher v. Thrasher, 
232 S.E.2d 734, 737 (Va. 1977) (Virginia Supreme Court held that, "contracts of a 
corporation made prior to its dissolution survive unless the circumstances are such that 
the contract must contemplate termination on such dissolution.") 
This principle was basically followed in a Utah case. See, Falconaero Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Valley Investment Company, 395 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). In Falconaero, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that dissolution of a corporation did not preclude that dissolved 
corporation from maintaining a quiet title action. A quiet title action is a right which was 
deemed to survive dissolution by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court relied on the holding of Holman v. 
Callister, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), to support its decision that the county's 
failure to notify Diamond T. Developments, Inc. was non-prejudicial and that Diamond 
T. Developments had no statutory right to bring its action against Defendants. However, 
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the holding in Holman is distinguishable from this case and thus the trial court erred in 
relying on its holding. 
In Holman, the court held that a corporation dissolved under the prior statute could 
not pursue claims for malpractice after its legal existence had ceased. Id at 897. In this 
case the trial court was dealing with a dissolved corporation, the contractual rights of 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc., not a claim for malpractice. As stated above the general 
rule is that contracts of a corporation made prior to its dissolution survive. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in relying on Holman's holding and should have instead followed the 
general precedent that contracts of dissolved corporation made prior to dissolution 
survive the dissolution. The Holman holding only applies to tort claims but does not 
apply to contract claims. Contract claims should be considered a part of the winding up 
of a corporation and therefore distinguishable from tort claims. Winding up is expressly 
allowed under the repealed statute. The trial court should not have relied upon the 
Holman case but should have relied upon the Falconaero case. 
The trial court further relied upon Utah Code Ann. §16-10-101 which states that 
the corporate existence of a corporation continues in existence for purposes of winding 
up its affairs. Clearly Diamond T. Developments, Inc. had not completed winding up of 
its affairs because of the rights that it held under the contract which was a matter of 
record and which Weber County did not honor in providing notice. 
In addition, the trial court totally ignored the new statute. The trial court decided 
not to apply Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1405 which was the law in effect at the time of the 
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lawsuit. This is the statute which should apply because it is the statute that was in effect 
at the time of the tax sale. Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1405(2) states as follows: 
Dissolution of a corporation does not: .. .(e) prevent commencement of a 
proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name.1 
Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the old corporate statutes. 
Based upon all of the above, the contractual right of Diamond T. Developments, 
Inc. did not disappear with the dissolution of the corporation. 
IV. IF DIAMOND T. DEVELOPMENT WAS FOUND TO NOT HAVE 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS OR STANDING THEN THE 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TRANSFERRED TO THE CORPORATE 
PRINCIPALS WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ENFORCE THEM. 
Even if Diamond T. Developments, Inc. is found not to have enforceable 
contractual rights or standing to bring a claim the trial court should have allowed Plaintiff 
to show whether or not the contractual rights of Diamond T. Developments as a dissolved 
corporation had been transferred to its principals and/or allowed the principals to have 
been substituted into the action to enforce the contractual rights. The contractual right 
which is generally not distinguished by dissolution should be deemed to have been 
transferred to the principals of the corporation and the principals of Diamond T. 
Developments should have the ability to be substituted into this action as the party 
Plaintiff. For instance, in Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy 
Recovery Special Service District, 979 P.2d 363 (Utah App. 1999) a requestor brought a 
complaint against the county special service district for allegedly violating the 
"Proceed ing" is defined under §16-I0a-102(26) as including a "civil suit, arbitration or mediation, and a criminal, administrative or an 
investigatory- action " 
n 
Government Records Access and Management Act. The original requestor was an 
unincorporated, voluntary environmental watch dog association. When the court found 
that that association had not been registered as conducting business under an assumed 
name, the court allowed for the curing of that deficiency by allowing for an amendment 
of the Complaint to substitute the real party in interest. 
In this case, the trial court has concluded that the rights of Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. were not prejudiced as a result of a wrongful tax sale. This is 
contrary to equitable principles because Diamond T. Developments did indeed have 
rights were violated. Even the trial court recognized that the tax sale was done 
improperly. Diamond T Developments' right a contractual right which was identified on 
the title report and for which the County should have provided notice. Diamond T. 
Developments lost any interest in the property as a result of the tax sale. Clearly, this is a 
prejudicial event. The fact that Diamond T. Developments had been administratively 
dissolved is a mere technicality for which the County cannot determine whether or not 
prejudice had occurred. Either Diamond T. Developments or its principals have the right 
to pursue this action. If the court determines that Diamond T. Developments cannot 
pursue this action, then clearly that right exists in the principals of the corporation as the 
natural transferees of that right. Under the doctrine of real party in interest, the court can 
allow for the amendment of the pleading to identify the principals of Diamond T. 
Developments, Inc. in place of Diamond T. Developments as the party Plaintiff in this 
matter. See, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 and Rule 25. The trial court should 
be directed to entertain this issue. Based upon the above, the court should allow for this 
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case to proceed and should allow for Diamond T. Developments and/or its principals to 
proceed in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellants request that the Court of Appeals find 
that the trial court erred in holding that the county's failure was non-prejudicial to 
Diamond T. Developments and furthermore that Diamond T. Developments had no 
statutory right to bring its action against Defendants. This Court should find that 
Diamond T. Developments was entitled to notice of the tax sale and that Weber County's 
failure to provide such notice deprived Diamond T. Developments of its due process 
rights to their property without fair notice. Therefore, this Court should require that the 
tax sale be set aside. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j O _ day of August, 2007. 
)arin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellant Diamond T. Developments, 
Inc. 
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